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RECENT DECISIONS
would return our courts to the common law interpretation of restitution of pro-
perty rights for an innocent donor. However, even if the donor who was not in-
nocent was allowed to recover, would not one of the basic policies of the heart-
balm legislation still be served, that of reducing the economic duress that can in-
fluence unwilling marriages? It seems that in the area of restitution of property
rights that legislation might even forge on beyond the common law recovery
notions, without any detriment to heart-balm policies, and even with- a chance
at greater promotion of those same policies.
William Sugnet
Use of Declaratory Judgment to Determine the Validity of
a Foreign ex parte Divorce
Plaintiff-wife, a New York resident, was legally separated from the
defendant-husband who was an alleged resident of New York State at all times.
The defendant obtained a Mexican divorce without the appearance of the plaintiff.
Subsequently, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, pronouncing the
Mexican divorce decree invalid for lack of jurisdiction and declaring that she was
still th6 defendant's lawful wife. Upon hearing of a motion to dismiss the
compleint for failure to state a cause of action, held: a doubtful Mexican divorce
decree is grounds for a declaratory judgment to determine marital status, and
remarriage of one of the parties is not a prerequisite for such a declaratory
judgment. Grutman v. Grutman, 7 Misc.2d 236, 166 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct.
1957.)
In New York State, the marital status of the parties is a proper subject
matter for a declaratory judgment. Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N.Y. 197, 192 N.E. 291
1934). The grant of a declaratory judgment lies in judicial discretion, but is not
to be granted without substantial grounds. Engel v. Engel, 275 App. Div. 14,
87 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1949). The problem in this area of law is the determin-
ation of what circumstances produce substantial grounds for a declaratory judgment.
A separation decree adjudicates an existing marital status only at the time of
the decree. Statter v. Statter, 2 N.Y.2d 668, 672, 163 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (1957).
If the divorce decreelwas prior to the separation decree, its invalidity would have
been adjudicated by necessity and an action for a declaratory judgment would be
rejected as superfluous. Garvin v. Garvin, 306 N.Y. 118, 116 N.E.2d 73 (1951).
However, a separation decree cannot decide what has not yet come into
existence. A separation decree does not foreclose the possibility of a later divorce
and would not affect the possibility of a declaratory judgment action attacking
the later divorce.
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In Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955), the
court held that where a Mexican divorce decree was being sought, which would
obviousl r be invalid on the stated facts, it was not necessary to enjoin the
dependant from procuring the decree. The utility of a similar argument in a
declaratory judgment action is prevented as the majority further reasoned that the
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law by utilizing a declaratory judgment
procedure. In both 'actions the plaintiff is attempting to secure her marital
rights. From this perspective, it appears logically inconsistent to allow an
obviously void Mexican divorce decree as grounds for a declaratory judgment,
but not grounds for an injunction preventing its procurement. The distinction is
best understood by noticing the differences in the form of relief. The injunction
is a form of personal restriction, whereas a declaratory judgment is an amicable
action, at least in appearance.
The typical situation where an action is brought to determine the marital
status of the parties by a declaratory judgment is after an ex parte foreign divorce
and the remarriage of that party. These cases are not numerous because: the
declaratory judgment procedure is of a comparatively recent growth, the ex parte
foreign divorces are usually acquired by cooperation between the parties, the
divorced spouse may elect to take no action or resort to some form of coercive
remedy. Jacobs, The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Migra-
tory Divorce, 2 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 370 (1935). Cases granting a
declaratory judgment determining an existing marriage after an ex parte foreign
dIivorce without a remarriage are exceedingly rare. Long v. Long, 281 App. Div.
254, 119 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st Dep't 1953): Martin v. Martin, 131 N.Y.S.2d 96
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
Prior to the instant case, the lack of remarriage in such a situation was not
mentioned in the courts' opinions. It seems dear, however, that remarriage of one
of the parties after an ex parte foreign divorce merely compounds the confusion
and the threat to the original spouse's marital status and rights. No person would
expend time and money for a divorce decree, even one of questionable validity,
without the thought of a possible utilization. Any use of such a decree attacks
the marital status and rights of the other spouse. A declaration by the court of an
existing marriage before a possible remarriage would protect the questionably
divorced spouse from uncertainty of her status and rights, deter the divorcing
spouse from entering into an invalid second marriage, and protect a hypothetical
third person from such an invalid marriage. For these reasons it is within the
public interest that remarriage of one of the parties be not a prerequisite to a
declaratory judgment to determine marital status after an ex parte foreign divorce.
Ronald Malin
